A Lawyer\u27s View of Conglomerate Mergers by Loughlin, John T.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 5 Volume 44, Spring 1970, Special 
Edition 
Article 48 
December 2012 
A Lawyer's View of Conglomerate Mergers 
John T. Loughlin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Loughlin, John T. (1970) "A Lawyer's View of Conglomerate Mergers," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 44 : No. 
5 , Article 48. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss5/48 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
A LAWYER'S VIEW OF CONGLOMERATE
MERGERS
JOHN T. LOUGHLIN*
INTRODUCTION
The number of definitions of conglomerate mergers is but slightly ex-
ceeded by the number of writers on the subject. However, a very simple
definition will suffice: any merger of companies in unrelated markets. The
questions to which this article is addressed may be stated with equal sim-
plicity:
1. Are existing antitrust laws adequate to deal effectively with con-
glomerate mergers?
2. If so, what antitrust standards should be applicable?
My answer to the first question is that existing law is adequate to deal with
conglomerate mergers to the extent that such mergers merit antitrust inter-
vention. To explain that answer and to develop a response to the second
question requires exploration of certain popular enforcement concepts.
SECTION 7 AND HORIZONTAL MERGERS
The furor resulting from Antitrust Chief McLaren's present crusade
against the conglomerate merger movement has tended to obscure the fact
that it was motivated, at least in part, by the antitrust enforcement policies
of his predecessors.
The Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act' be-
came law on December 29, 1950. Remedying what had been described
by the Federal Trade Commission in its 1947 Report on Mergers 2 as a mon-
strous loophole in the 1914 law, the new statute was greeted with a rash of
inactivity, suggesting that the FTC had greatly overstated the urgency of
the need for a new statute. The first case under the new legislation was not
filed until almost two years after the enactment,3 and the next two years
saw only two new cases. 4 But as time went on, largely as a result of increas-
ing congressional pressures, the pace of litigation quickened. It was soon
discovered that section 7 cases could be effectively used to fatten admin-
istrative budgets. Then too, the Antitrust Division, which had been sub-
jected to the same congressional attention, entered into competition with
the Commission for section 7 cases. In 1955, five complaints were filed, two
by the FTC5 and three by the Antitrust Division.6
* Member of the Illinois Bar. B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1947; LL.B., University
of Wisconsin, 1949; Assistant General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, 1954-1958.
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT (1948).
3 Pillsbury Mills, Inc., FTC No. 6000 (June 16, 1952).
4 Crown Zellerbach Corp., FTC No. 6180 (Feb. 15, 1954); Luria Bros., Inc., FTC
No. 6156 (Jan. 19, 1954).
5 Union Bag & Paper Corp., FTC No. 6391 (June 30, 1955); Farm Journal, Inc., FTC
No. 6388 (June 30, 1955).
6 United States v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade Cas.) 68,664,
at 72,700 (D. Del. 1957) (consent decree); United States v. General Shoe Corp., 3 TRADE
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As congressional interest continued, as competition between the two
enforcement agencies grew, and as their budgets increased, there developed
substantial numbers of cases, which in turn ultimately gave birth to a rule
of law: Any horizontal merger opposed by either the Federal Trade Com-
mission or the Antitrust Division is unlawful.
This rule did not become absolute until the 1950 statute had been law
for approximately 16 years, the case delineating it in its absolute form be-
ing United States v. Von's Grocery Co. 7 However, the development of the
rule followed a clearly traceable path. In the earliest cases in the 1950s, the
issue of anticompetitive effect was of great importance; injury to competi-
tion was either shown to exist or to be reasonably predictable on the basis
of evidence on the record. For example, the leading case of FTC v. Crown
Zellerbachs involved the acquisition by a company controlling approxi-
mately 50 percent of its market, of a company with an additional 12 percent
of that market. In addition to the 62 percent market share of the combined
enterprise, the record delineated specific anticompetitive consequences of
the acquisition, such as restrictions placed by the combined enterprise upon
the ability of independent distributors to obtain needed goods which they
had previously obtained from the acquired company and which, after the
acquisition, had been diverted to the acquiring company's owned or favored
channels.
Crown Zellerbach, decided in 1961, was followed two years later by
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,9 in which a 30 percent market
share resulting from a horizontal acquisition was found to be "inherently
anticompetitive," obviating the need for a showing of anticompetitive effect
and thus establishing what amounted to a per se rule for horizontal acqui-
sitions involving substantial market shares. It was held that a showing of
economic benefits to the citizenry or to business in the areas concerned was
beside the point; the acquisition was deemed unlawful because it contrib-
uted to concentration."0
The Supreme Court carried this principle to the ultimate extreme in
United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,11 where it condemned a horizontal
merger which had created a combined market share of about 7.5 percent
of the retail grocery sales in the area, again without actual demonstration
of existing anticompetitive effects and, more importantly, without delinea-
tion of specific predictable anticompetitive effects. Thus was the per se
rule extended to acquisitions involving inconsequential market shares.
In my own view, the concept that the basic purpose of the Clayton Act
R G. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 68,271, at 71,227 (D. Tenn. 1956) (consent decree); United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) 68,253, at 71,171
(D. Ill. 1959) (consent decree).
7 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
8 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
9 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
1Old. at 370-71.
11 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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is to prevent economic concentration by "keeping a large number of small
competitors in business"'12 misses the point of the statute. Rather than keep-
ing smaller companies in business, the intent of the law is to preserve a
competitive environment which encourages small businesses to enter and
helps them to survive; and then, if they so choose, permits them to exit,
reaping the reward for their efforts by selling at the best price. The Von's
Grocery rule is absolute as to any horizontal merger opposed by the Gov-
ernment because every such acquisition per se makes a contribution to
economic concentration, at least when measured as of the moment of the
acquisition - which is as far as the enforcement authorities have desired
to look, for to look farther could complicate the economic picture and up-
set tidy rules of thumb.
The preoccupation of the enforcement authorities with horizontal ac-
quisitions had two important consequences: (a) the number of horizontal
mergers substantially diminished; and (b) the growth-minded companies
were compelled to seek acquisitions in non-horizontal areas. This search for
different types of mergers was not only necessitated by the prevailing anti-
horizontal merger policies, but even appeared to be somewhat encouraged
by the authorities.1 3 This administrative approach provided fertile ground
for the new breed of conglomerators today defending their moves in court.
It is not at all surprising that in March of 1968 (two years after the
decision in Von's Grocery), the Federal Trade Commission reported that
conglomerate mergers had reached a "record level," accounting for 83 per-
cent of all large mergers.14 The Commission then announced the institution
of a major study of conglomerate mergers,' 5 a study which formed the
basis for a staff report published in November of 1969.16 Also, by early
1968, the Antitrust Division had joined in the view that conglomerate
mergers might require attention; for instance, a trade journal headline
stated that the Antitrust Chief had concluded that "Legislation is Needed
to Expand Scope of Attack on Conglomerate Merger." It is interesting to
note that at this very time and thereafter, officials of both the Commission
and the Division were taking bows for their success against horizontal merg-
ers. For example, one such official expressed great pride in the fact that
the horizontal merger had become a very "rare bird." Yet at the same time,
the enforcers' laments about the new conglomerate wave were demonstrat-
ing that the "victory" over horizontal merger had been a Phyrric one.
12 Id. at 275.
Is "If we exercise reasonable restraint in formulating rules on other kinds of mergers,
a tough rule on horizontal mergers simply shuts off some merger alternatives, not all."
Conference Transcript, Basic Antitrust Questions in the Middle Sixties (National Industrial
Conference Board, March 5, 1966).
14 549 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-12, 15 (Mar. 19, 1968).
1 365 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-10 (July 9, 1968).
16BuREAu OF EcoNoMIcs, FTC, EcoNoMIc REPORT ON CONGLOMERATE MERGERS (1969)
(hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Section 7 and Conglomerate Mergers
Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this commentary,
the strong affirmative answer to the first, i.e., that existing antitrust laws
are clearly applicable to conglomerate mergers and competent to prevent
any conglomerate merger which should be prevented for legitimate anti-
trust reasons, is based upon the language and legislative history of the
statute. There is no exclusion of conglomerate mergers -any such view is
but a vestige of the antitrust enforcers' past preference for the horizontal
variety of cases (the challenge of conglomerate cases was apparently easy to
resist when "lead pipe cinch" horizontal cases were available). The question
was answered succinctly and definitively by the Supreme Court in FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co.,17 when it stated: "All mergers are within the reach of
§ 7, and all must be tested by the same standard, whether they are classified
as horizontal, vertical, conglomerate, or other."'18
The second key question relates to the standards to be applied to con-
glomerate merger enforcement. The single sentence quoted above from
Procter & Gamble answers this question as well, and the conclusion is firmly
supported in the legislative history.1 9 Section 7 has a single standard: sub-
stantial lessening of competition or tendency to monopoly. Translating this
for conglomerate merger purposes, the logical test would appear to be that
a conglomerate merger will be regarded as unlawful when it is reasonably
predictable, on the basis of economic expertise, that the merger will sub-
stantially lessen competition with (a) competitors of either of the merged
corporations; (b) customers of either of the merged corporations; or (c) sup-
pliers of either of the merged corporations.
In applying the above test, it is emphasized that in any type merger,
"injury" must not be assumed from increases in efficiency or service, prod-
uct improvements or innovations, or reductions in cost. Where such results
are obtainable, there is absolutely no reason why their benefits should be
denied to the economy. Competitors encountering this type of "injury"
should use their time and efforts to imitate or improve upon the advances
of the merging companies, rather than attempting to persuade the antitrust
authorities in Washington to oppose the merger. An inexcusable antitrust
attack was that which aborted the proposed merger of Abbott Laboratories
and Nuclear-Chicago Corp. several years ago, on the basis, among others,
that the combination would have been able to pioneer advances in medical
17 386 U.S. 568 (1967). Here, the Court held that Procter & Gamble's acquisition of
Clorox was proscribed by section 7 due to the competitive advantages which would inure
to Clorox from the merger. One main advantage would be access to the substantial
advertising discounts given to Procter & Gamble by virtue of the great volume of media
resources purchased.
18 Id. at 577.
19 The House Report accompanying the bill amending the Clayton Act in 1950
sought "to make it clear that the bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions,
vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal .. " But, it adds, ". . . which have the
specified effects of substantially lessening competition ... or tending to create a monopoly."
H.R. R P,. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
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applications of nuclear energy.20 Such progress benefits both humanity and
competition by providing competitive incentive for all others in the field.
Similarly, economic success also serves to attract outsiders to the new field.
Let us turn now to the tests which Antitrust Chief McLaren has out-
lined in the antimerger complaints resulting from the anticonglomerate
crusade launched in 1969.21 His basic tests are three: (1) effects upon po-
tential competition; (2) reciprocity effects; and (3) economic concentration
effects. Only the third is new in the conglomerate merger context; the first
two tests have already achieved a measure of acceptance, but it would be
a mistake to apply them without in-depth economic analysis.
The decision in United States v. Penn-Olin Oil Co. 22 established that
the effect upon potential competition is an appropriate subject for con-
sideration under section 7. However, the concept is by no means an easy
one to apply if that section is to accomplish its stated purpose of pre-
venting competitive injury; it must be recognized that the potential com-
petition test has a capacity for evolving into a gambit to apply the "easy"
horizontal merger tests to mergers which lack horizontal overlap. Fore-
closing the entrance of a company which has considered entry by internal
expansion may not be sufficient when related to the injury criterion of ex-
isting law, for in many industries entry by internal expansion will tend to
have a greater potential for competitive injury than entry by acquisition.
At the same time, by denying an existing company its right to sell out to
an entering company at a decent profit, the value of existing companies
in the industry is diminished, thereby compounding the destructive effect
upon them. Since many industries cannot be entered effectively without
merger, precluding that type entry will also tend to exclude the competi-
tion of the "potential" competitor who has surveyed the industry and con-
cluded that entry is impossible except by acquisition or merger. And, finally,
it should be noted that the oft lamented "disappearance" of the acquired
company will usually be temporary, simply because this type of disappear-
ance generally stimulates the birth of new independent companies.
This discussion is not intended to suggest that necessarily all entry ac-
quisitions by large companies should be deemed lawful. Obviously, where
a company deploys its size and power to produce post-acquisition competi-
tive injury, or where these results are clearly predictable on the basis of
expert economic inquiry, this affords a basis for divestiture, as was the case
in the Procter & Gamble acquisition of Clorox.2
The second major test in the pending conglomerate merger cases, that
20 However, due to the termination of the merger, the complaint was dismissed. ,
21 See, e.g., United States v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 306 F.
Supp. 766 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438
(W.D. Pa., April 14, 1969).
22 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd. mem., 389 U.S. 308 (1967). Here, the Court
extended section 7's prohibition to joint ventures as well as mergers by potential com-
petitors.
23 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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of reciprocal effects, has also achieved acceptance, and when properly ap-
plied, generally has substantial relevance to the injury criterion of section 7.
Indeed, one may well question the previous inaction of the enforcement
agencies during the development of a business weapon which is available
in its objectionable forms only to the most powerful companies.
It is to be hoped, however, that in utilizing the reciprocity test, the
enforcement authorities and the courts will analyze carefully the facts of
each case, avoiding application of the concept to remote possibilities. For
example, one of the adverse reciprocal effects alleged in the complaint against
the merger of Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) with Jones & Laughlin Steel Com-
pany (J c L)24 consists of the following: J & L buys iron ore from mining
companies, the operations of which necessarily require the use of mining
cable, a product produced by the Okonite subsidiary of LTV. Whether this
is a real or a remote example of reciprocity appears to depend upon develop-
ment of other factors, such as: (1) whether mining cable is an important
day-to-day element of mining expense; (2) whether mining companies sell
their products under contractual relationships negotiated on the basis of
supply and demand in a bargaining context in which cable purchases might
be considered a comic intrusion; (3) whether competing cable manufactur-
ing companies are large, integrated and well able to wage competition.
Reciprocity appears to be a crucial element of the complaint in the
case involving the acquisition of Automatic Canteen by International Tele-
phone &c Telegraph Corp. (ITT).25 ITT has hundreds of plant and office
establishments and literally thousands of suppliers throughout the country.
Automatic Canteen, of course, operates food and vending concessions in
business establishments on a nation-wide basis. Here, the subject for eco-
nomic inquiry appears to be less complex; to determine if, now that ITT,
through Automatic Canteen, is engaged in the food and vending business,
suppliers of food and vending service to ITT facilities and suppliers are
in jeopardy of foreclosure from this business.
Reciprocity, as such, is not the basic subject of this article, but it should
be noted that, like the current conglomerate merger movement, reciprocity
as it exists today represents, in part, past failures of antitrust enforcement.
For example, just a few years ago one of Mr. McLaren's predecessors indi-
cated that he was not excited about reciprocity.2 It has also been reported
that a national association of trade relations experts was created at the sug-
gestion of a staff member of the Federal Trade Commission.27 Under these
24 United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., April 14,
1969). The major theory upon which this action is based, however, is that the merger
eliminated the competitive threat posed by LTV's potential independent entry into the
oligopolistic steel industry.
25 United States v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 301 F. Supp. 1066
(N.D. 111. 1969).
26 Address by Donald F. Turner before the American Bar Association's Antitrust Sec.
tion, April 14, 1966.
27 A Customer Is a Friend, FORTUNE, June 1965, at 194.
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circumstances, it is hardly appropriate for the enforcement agencies to
strike too deeply or too boldly against everything that has reciprocal aspects.
I do not mean to defend reciprocity. Coercive or systematic reciprocity
is offensive to economic morals, injurious to competition and unhealthy for
the company practicing it. In one sense it appears to be selling on the
strength of purchasing muscle, but in another real sense, it represents a
selling weakness, tending toward ineffective purchasing and increasingly
weakened ability to sell on the merits of the particular product or service
involved. In view of the foreclosure effect, action against reciprocity is surely
in order. But that action should be reasonable, balanced and temperate; it
is rather late in the day to outlaw all horse-trading or to outlaw mergers
because incidental horse-trading may be feared.
It is regrettable that the enforcers' interest in reciprocity had to be
awakened by the use of this issue as a tool to combat mergers, for reciprocity
can also result from internal expansion into a new field. Since such entry
is promoted by the enforcement agencies, it would appear that enforcement
in such instances must be limited to terminating the practice of reciprocity
rather than the entry. Similarly, in merger situations any reciprocity evil
may often be terminated without divestiture. Thus, in merger cases where
reciprocity is the sole anticompetitive result, it may be possible to limit
divestiture orders to those cases where it is predictable that substantial re-
ciprocal effects will occur even in the absence of the active practice of reci-
procity. Where, however, a merger will merely afford the opportunity to
practice reciprocity, an order forbidding the practice would suffice.
We move now to the third and, clearly, the most important and most
controversial criterion guiding Mr. McLaren's anticonglomerate crusade -
what has been described as the "super-concentration" theory. The complaint
in United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. alleges:
Ownership of manufacturing assets in the United States is becoming in-
creasingly concentrated. The proportion of the total assets of the nation's
manufacturing corporations held by the 200 largest firms increased from
48.1 percent in 1948 to 54.2 percent in 1960 and 58.7 percent in 1967. The
great bulk of this increase in concentration has resulted from mergers and
acquisitions. 28
One astonishing aspect of the super concentration theory advanced in the
current series of conglomerate merger cases is that President Nixon's chief
trustbuster appears to have adopted the economic theme of President John-
son's principal antitrust economic expert, Dr. Willard Mueller of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. The statistics in the current complaints are similar
to those contained in a statement by Dr. Mueller before the House Ways
and Means Committee Hearing on March 12, 1969.29 The complaint lan-
guage also parallels the thrust of the recent FTC Staff Report entitled Eco-
28 Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., April 14, 1969).
29 401 BNA AznrrRusr & TRtADE REG. REP. X-1 (1969).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
nomic Report on Corporate Mergers,O which commences as follows: "In
unprecedented fashion the current merger movement is centralizing and
consolidating corporate control and decision-making among a relatively few
vast companies." 3'
Similar words have been heard before, most notably in the Temporary
National Economic Committee Report on its "Investigation of Concentra-
tion of Economic Power"3 2 in 1941, but all of these arguments and statistics
sound rather mild when contrasted with the earlier complaint of a politi-
cian who stated, "The relentless, remorseless and unyielding grasp of mo-
nopoly is upon every avenue of trade and commerce." That statement was
made in 1890.
Economic concentration is the same catchword criterion which pur-
portedly justified the questionable decision in Von's Grocery.33 One impor-
tant difference should be noted, however. When Mr. McLaren uses the
concept of concentration in his anticonglomerate program, he refers not to
concentration within a specific industry, but rather, to "super concentra-
tion" in industry as a whole. Taken alone, this proposed new conglomerate
merger test amounts to an attack upon size.
To demonstrate the impropriety of economic concentration as a test
for conglomerate mergers, it is helpful to explain why that test has been
improperly applied to horizontal mergers. Acceptance of the contention
that horizontal mergers are presumptively anticompetitive demonstrates a
lack of faith in competition, an unawareness of changing national needs,
and a lack of appreciation of the practical effects of most horizontal mergers.
It is "horse and buggy" antitrust philosophy premised on two presumed
needs: (1) to prevent a decrease in the number of competitors and (2) to
protect the other remaining competitors from the supposedly increased
efficiency and ability of the newly merged organizations. The first prop-
osition, that the combination of two successful competing businesses is
violative of antitrust principles because a competitor is eliminated and con-
centration is increased, assumes a static structure and neglects the important
fact that merger activity is often one of the greatest stimulants to the eco-
nomic birth rate. This may be illustrated by what might be termed the "Fat
Cat Doctrine." Suppose that a certain alley is populated by two vigorous,
combative cats, one of whom subsequently disappears. Thereafter, as a re-
sult of the lack of competition, the remaining cat has a tendency to fatten
and relax. When this occurs the alley of the "fat cat" is sure to be invaded
by several lean and hungry young cats.
An example of a merger which quickly produced substantial new entry
occurred in 1960, when there was just one company of a specific type serving
30 FTC REPORT at 1-21.
31 Id. at 3.
32 TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF
ECONOMIC POWER (TNEC Monograph No. 21, 1941).
33 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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the entire city of Las Vegas, Nevada, with great efficiency and with great
personal attention to the needs of the individual customers. When this busi-
ness was acquired by a substantial national company in the same business,
the Federal Trade Commission Staff objected that the acquisition would
entrench the dominant company and would deter or foreclose entry due to
the fact that small companies in this essentially service business would be
unable to compete with the "national giant." However, the record showed
that by the time the Commission had completed its investigation, almost
a dozen new companies had entered the business. They were able to do so
because the national company was unable to provide the personal service
at which small local companies excel. With some exceptions (e.g., auto-
mobile manufacturing, newspapers, steel, glass), horizontal mergers tend to
encourage the birth of new companies.
Contrary to popular theory and the second proposition above, hori-
zontal mergers more often benefit rather than injure the remaining com-
panies. And generally, the bigger the merger, the more it may help the
remaining independent competitors; the new entity is unable to retain all
of the business formerly held by both of the merging companies, and old
and new independents quickly seize upon this opportunity to improve their
own position.
A specific example may be seen in the merger in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
of the two leading department stores, Gimbel's and Schuster's. The Govern-
ment sued,3 4 expecting its case to be bolstered by testimony from the smaller
competitors in the area that the combination would be injurious. Much to
their surprise, the trustbusters found that most of the competing department
stores were pleased with the merger because they knew that the new com-
bination could not control the business of both the old stores, and that the
smaller competitors would actually have more rather than less business.
The concept of perpetuating decentralized merchandising systems is of
doubtful validity in an economic climate which demands national, as well
as local merchandising and service systems. Congress desired to protect com-
petition, not an unchanging head count of competitors; and horizontal
mergers often represent a normal and healthy method of competition. Con-
gress was much more interested in the well-being of consumers, than in the
perpetuation of specific "Mom and Pop" grocery stores. The crowning error,
however, is the fact that in seeking to protect small business, existing hori-
zontal merger policy tends to have the opposite effect.
This is not to minimize the importance of "Mom and Pop" and their
comer store; modern social and economic needs are such that the consumer
requires more than those benefits which flow from size in the production
and distribution of new and finer goods. Indeed, modern times demonstrate
,that a progressive "Mom and Pop" have been able to do far better than
their predecessors in the 1930s and 1940s. They may charge somewhat more
34 United States v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 779 (D. Wis. 1962).
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for many items, but the higher price generally reflects individualized service
which is far beyond the capabilities of the large chains. In fact, today "Mom
and Pop" often fare so well that they expand their activities until owner-
ship of a small chain of neighborhood stores is achieved. However, we even-
tually find them "minding the store" or stores, moving toward retirement
and facing a merger policy which prohibits the most successful in their class
from selling to buyers who are both willing and able to pay them the best
price. This ignores a basic principle of practical economics, i.e., that the
"right of exit" at a fair price is one of the best incentives to new business
entry. In addition, it ignores the fact that the exit of one local independent
through merger with a national or larger regional organization, not only
aids those remaining independents, but generally has a direct tendency to
increase their number by attracting new entries.
Speaking before the annual antitrust program of the National Indus-
trial Conference Board in March, 1968, leading antitrust economist Dr.
Irston Barnes noted the fact that Government antitrust activity too fre-
quently is "inconsistent with maintaining a healthy, competitive free enter-
prise economy." 35 He stated:
Merger law enforcement offers a disturbing demonstration of antitrust ac-
tions which are often irrelevant to a competitive economy. This deplorable
state of affairs has come about not because there is any dearth of mergers
which invite antitrust attention but because the court-devised tests of ille-
gality are meaningless in terms of preserving competition.36
Down through the years, a substantial amount of economic mischief has
been perpetrated in the name of antitrust. Past and current antimerger
policy is an example. Indeed, the negative effect of the prevailing guide-
lines tends to frustrate and thus injure the competition intended to be pro-
tected.
Some horizontal mergers are obviously anticompetitive. But as a gen-
eral proposition, only acquisitions by a dominant company or a combina-
tion producing such a company raise a genuine threat to competition. All
others should be almost presumptively lawful because they serve to create
more effective competition for the leaders; and at the same time the union
of two companies in a market often tends to make that market more rather
than less attractive for the entry of new and smaller companies. Actually,
small and medium sized competitors probably should be encouraged to
merge, for through combination they improve their ability to compete, to
survive, to profit and to serve. It is true that the enforcement agencies can-
not be said to state general opposition to small mergers, but the Von's
Grocery case gives them the power to do so effectively if they should so
choose.
The enforcement record against horizontal mergers strongly indicates
35 Transcript, Seventh Conference on Antitrust Issues in Today's Economy (National
Industrial Conference Board, 1968).
36 Id.
LAWYER'S VIEW OF CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
"overkill." It is the thesis of this article that a similar "overkill" against
conglomerates is a distinct possibility if the super concentration theory is
adopted; that the overall result of too much antitrust control could well be
worse than too little control; and that this would be injurious to the econ-
omy as well as bad antitrust.
For purposes of discussion (and with obvious risk of oversimplification),
conglomerate mergers may be divided into three categories. The first in-
cludes those which have no anticompetitive consequences and which possess
a sound economic rationale. A second category, suspected by many to exist,
is the "house of cards" type - those motivated primarily by financial and
stock market considerations. Although lacking sound business rationale,
these involve no adverse antitrust consequences. The third category con-
sists of conglomerates which may, in the words of the amended Clayton Act,
"substantially lessen competition."
As to the first category, there is neither a need nor a basis for the Gov-
ernment to act. While financial considerations may be important in moti-
vating the combination, economic benefits do flow from the merger. The
most desirable combinations will be those which involve sufficient economic
relativity to permit increased managerial effectiveness and yet enough dif-
ference to assist in eliminating cyclical vulnerabilities.
As to the second category, the action of the marketplace is sufficient
to preserve competition. The lack of a firm base may soon produce volun-
tary divestiture of poorly fitting parts or even a break-up of the entire orga-
nization. Some budding conglomerates have already been compelled to
perform a veritable corporate strip-tease as they rapidly shed acquisitions.
This voluntary divestiture occurs without need for antitrust intervention;
indeed, there is no relativity to antitrust considerations. Far from injuring
competitors of the acquired company, such acquisitions often provide them
with splendid opportunities to increase their percentage of the market. This
illustrates the point that Mr. McLaren's tax and securities arguments, as
well as his other allegations, are unrelated to antitrust, except that their
thrust tends to make antitrust intervention less meaningful, and even un-
necessary.
As to the third, the antitrust enforcers in earlier administrations (with
very minor exceptions) avoided the challenge, at least partially because such
cases presented new and difficult problems of proof. Instead, they preferred
to concentrate on the "push-over" horizontal cases, while taking refuge in
the position that new legislation was needed to control conglomerate growth.
All should be grateful to new Antitrust Chief McLaren for at least having
the courage to give existing legislation a chance; however, such gratitude
should be tempered by recognition that the thrust of the McLaren attack
goes far beyond traditional antitrust concepts and may involve danger to
the economy. The apparent effort to employ the "superconcentration"
theory not only against specific mergers, but against the conglomerate move-
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ment in general (a movement which, paradoxically, antitrust helped to start
and which, in very large part, involves non-antitrust issues), amounts in its
ultimate analysis to an attack upon corporate size. Throughout antitrust
history, the enforcement chiefs and the courts have consistently adhered to
the principle that size alone is not an offense. Adoption of the "super
concentration" theory would constitute a sharp reversal of this guiding
yardstick.
Whether there has been a trend toward dangerous economic concentra-
tion is primarily a question for statisticians and economists. To a lawyer
standing on the side lines of that statistical debate, it appears that each side
is able to muster up a set of figures establishing some point, until the other
side rejoins with its own collection of figures. That is the trouble with
statistics. I should like to note only two points which have been neglected.
The first is that in the current statistics of the economists who portray
the evils of galloping concentration, no reference whatsoever has been made
to one of the economic epithets which Franklin Delano Roosevelt employed
so effectively in his political campaigns. More specifically, what has
happened to FDR's "Sixty Ruling Families"? The answer, of course, is that
a great deal has happened. Stock control of practically all major industrial
corporations has become so splinterized that no individual or family can
be said to control any of the biggest corporations. Further, to a great extent
this has been accomplished by mergers and acquisitions which brought
substantial blocks of new shareholders into these corporations.
But there has been an even greater influence, producing what might
be described as a significant form of economic deconcentration. The latest
available statistics indicate that at the present time more than 26 million
Americans are shareholders of American corporations.3 7 Comparable statis-
tics for 1952 indicated that less than 6 million persons owned stock.
Moreover, statistics for the last several years show that the rate of increase
of Americans owning stock is rapidly increasing. It should also be noted
that these statistics do not reflect the many additional millions of citizens
who have a beneficial interest in American business through pension-fund
stock ownership, a trend which is also constantly accelerating. Most of the
country's great insurance corporations have entered the mutual fund
business, with the result that thousands of insurance agents from coast to
coast have, in effect, become corporate stock salesmen. As a result, it is
conceivable that in one fashion or another, the majority of Americans own
corporate stock,38 a level of economic deconcentration which would have
been considered an impossible dream just a few decades ago.
My second point is that the increasing size of corporations and their
economic stability is not only not inconsistent with national goals, but is
indeed necessary. In Europe, it required a grand consortium of two
37 New York Stock Exchange estimate.
38 Time Magazine estimates a total of 101 million. See TIME, Feb. 16, 1970, at 82.
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countries, and practically the entire aircraft industry of both, to plan and
produce an SST. In this country, a single manufacturer is expected to
accomplish the task. Economic concentration is essentially a structural test.
And in most cases structure has no relevance to competitive injury, which
is the statutory test. Changes in structure through merger often result from
changes in needs for products and services. As such, they are responsive to
society; and to a great extent, modern society makes "super demands"
which can only be filled by "super companies."
The "super concentration" theory has not yet met acceptance in
litigation before the federal courts. In the case of United States v. Northwest
Industries, Inc.,89 which involved Northwest's proposed acquisition of B.F.
Goodrich, Judge Hubert Will of the U.S. District Court for Northern
Illinois stated:
The issue of concentration raises a special question, for the Government
is here urging that given a trend to economic concentration, the con-
solidation of two of the country's one hundred largest corporations
constitutes a violation of Section 7 without any specific demonstration of
a substantial lessening of competition in any section of the country. We do
not so read Section 7 . . . . The law as it now stands . . . makes the
adverse effect on competition the test of validity and until Congress
broadens the criteria, the Court must judge proposed transactions on
that standard.40
Similarly, in United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,4'
Chief Judge William H. Timbers of the U.S. District Court for Connecticut,
citing the Northwest Industries case, stated:
A merger which has the effect of increasing economic concentration, even
substantially, however does not necessarily lessen competition substantially,
and evidence that a merger may increase economic concentration, without
more, is not sufficient to halt a merger under Section 7 without a specific
showing that it may have anticompetitive effects .... 42
At the same time, both of the above decisions, which dealt only with
petitions for preliminary injunctions, fully recognized the applicability
of the antitrust laws to conglomerate mergers which substantially lessen
competition. These holdings demonstrate the utility of antitrust as an effec-
tive tool in some instances, but not where the motivation and the results of
a merger have nothing to do with traditional antitrust concepts. Antitrust
should be utilized only against those conglomerate acquisitions that involve
an injurious effect upon competition. Radical remedies are simply not
warranted on the basis of existing evidence. As has been noted, competition
itself has, in many instances, caused the voluntary divestiture of economically
89 501 F. Supp. 1066 (D. I1. 1969). The motion by the Government for a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the merger was denied.
40 Id. at 1096.
41306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
42 Id. at 796.
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unsound acquisitions. Such performance failures have helped to decelerate
the conglomerate merger trend. Similarly, authoritative financial experts
have speculated that the conglomerate trend, and indeed the merger
movement, may be slowed by a pending proposal of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants in connection with the pooling of interest
concept of accounting.48 Undoubtedly, there are also tax and securities
regulations of various types which could serve to discourage undesirable
mergers. This is not to recommend any specific moves (which are, in any
event, beyond the competence of one active only in antitrust), but only to
point out that if undesirable consequences exist in these areas, the remedies
are to be found in these areas. Antitrust should be expected to accomplish
its task only where antitrust considerations are valid.
The Attorney General and Mr. McLaren have spoken of various social
consequences of conglomerate mergers, presumably arguing that these justify
broad antitrust intervention. Yet, antitrust enforcement officials periodically
attempt to glamorize their often resented role by pro bono publico type press
releases. Some examples are the statement by Attorney General Katzenbach a
few years ago that antitrust was to be used to check inflation and the
announcement by his predecessor as Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, of
the intent to invoke the antitrust laws to curb the business activities of the
crime syndicate. Predictably, Attorney General Mitchell has announced
similar discoveries and similar intent.4 4 It is to be hoped that the results will
exceed those flowing from the efforts of previous administrations. Antitrust
needs none of this press-agentry which over-promises, and in the case of the
social, financial, tax and securities implications of conglomerate mergers,
distinctly over-reaches. The prevention of restraint of trade requires no
apology.
In addition, it should be pointed out that of the available alternatives,
there is one that should be feared even more than the antitrust "overkill"
implicit in the opening fanfare of the McLaren crusade. This is the anti-
conglomerate legislation of the type that has been proposed by various
sources. Former Antitrust Chief Donald F. Turner proposed legislation "that
would prohibit companies from going beyond a certain size."'45 The White
House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, in a report released May 21, 1969,
recommended a "Concentrated Industries Act," 46 establishing criteria and
procedures for prevention and reduction of concentration by divestiture.
431 mperiled Mergers -Proposed Measurement of Corporate Goodwill May Curb
Acquisitions, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 27, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
44 Address by John N. Mitchell before the American Bar Association's Antitrust Sec-
tion, March 27, 1969.
45 "For example, * * Congress should pass a statute that would say to the top 50
or 100 companies 'any time you make an acquisition of a certain size you must peel off
assets of comparable magnitude.'" Hearings on the Status and Future of Small Business
in the American Economy Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 2, at 713 (1967) (Statement of Donald F. Turner).
46 1968 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 CONG. REC. 5642 (daily
ed. May 27, 1969).
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Under the latter, the leading companies in any industry which is considered
concentrated would be required to reduce their share of the market to
specified guidelines. It is predictable that the result would be a virtual
cartelization of affected industries, and it is difficult to imagine any arrange-
ment that could have a more depressing effect upon product innovation and
improvement.
Further, with companies limited to a specific percentage of the market,
we would have a situation similar to that involved in the electrical goods
cases, where the phases of the moon and other artifices were invoked by the
companies as they attempted to stay within the percentage limits decreed by
the cartel. A company which had achieved its fixed maximum for the year,
for example, would be unable to bid, or at least unable to bid seriously, for
any business which would raise its percentage above the permitted limit.
The temptation to trade customers would be almost irresistible. At the same
time, legislation limiting market shares in any specific industry would, as
the capital of growth-minded corporations sought an outlet, (as was the
case with the anti-horizontal merger campaigns) necessarily have the result
of promoting conglomerate acquisitions.
Only slightly less ominous is the "super concentration" theory espoused
by Antitrust Chief McLaren and the FTC Bureau of Economics Report on
Mergers. If this theory is adopted by the courts, the net result would be
comparable to an overall corporate size limit achievable by merger. The
FTC47 and the Attorney General 48 currently talk in terms of one of the
largest 200 companies acquiring either another of the largest 200 or a large
company in a concentrated industry. That would just be the start. One must
recall the horizontal merger area - 62 percent of a market was held unlaw-
ful in 1962; 30 percent was held "inherently anticompetitive" in 1965; and
finally, just a year later, the figure had become the wholly illogical 7.5
percent. The difficulty is that every merger, regardless of its size at the time
of merger, necessarily involves what appears at that moment to be an
increase in concentration. Thus, adoption of the super concentration
rationale could lead to a new absolute rule for conglomerate acquisitions:
Any large acquisition by any large company is unlawful if the Government
chooses to oppose it.
As with the rule now applicable to horizontal mergers, this would
amount to a rule not of law but of men, a situation already too characteristic
of antitrust enforcement. The criterion for action under such a rule is the
state of mind of whoever happens to be the enforcement chief at any given
moment. There are no ascertainable legal guidelines for the conduct of
business. This type of rule, instead of mandating legal rationale, tends to
invite the subject firms to exercise their gambling instincts, knowing that
because of staff size and legal resources, as well as the political, emotional
47 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
48 Address by John N. Mitchell before the Georgia State Bar Association, in 413 BNA
ANTrrRuST & TRADE REG. REP. X-ll (1969).
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and economic attitudes of the administrators and their superiors, not all
mergers which could be successfully assailed would be or could be singled
out for action. The decision as to which mergers should be subjected to
litigation would depend upon factors such as complaints received, availabil-
ity of qualified prosecution lawyers, cost of litigation, the degree of difficulty
of the economic analysis involved, and in some cases, what may, in the last
analysis, amount to coin-flipping. The entire situation presents an enticing
invitation for political, congressional, and influence-peddling pressures
against or for a specific suit.
Intelligent approach to the antitrust problems of conglomerate mergers
would be facilitated by a reevaluation of the standards now applicable to
horizontal mergers. Additionally, conglomerate mergers should not be
regarded either as a new antitrust problem or as a pure antitrust problem.
Rather, the approach should be conducted on several fronts. First, the
enforcement policy against horizontal mergers should be relaxed by giving
realistic and practical recognition to the fact that most are harmless and
many are beneficial to competition. The benefits should be weighed on a
case-by-case basis. Economic analysis should no longer be short-circuited,
as it was in the Von's Grocery case. This would reopen the more normal
channels of development for growth-minded companies. Secondly, each case
against a conglomerate merger should be evaluated on basic antitrust criteria,
and the "super concentration" theory should be rejected. Thirdly, to the
extent that conglomerate mergers may involve undesirable financial, secur-
ities, or tax consequences, the remedial measures should be sought in the
financial, securities or tax regulation areas.
The alarmist talk about "dangerous" merger movements neglects the
very important point that in those eras when mergers increase, there is
usually a corresponding increase in successful new business entries; when
mergers decrease, there are fewer effective entries. Most mergers have
nothing to do with restraints of trade, and this is becoming more true as
time goes by. Old antitrust enforcement policies were based largely on the
proposition that fewer companies led to higher prices. However, no scientific
evidence has ever established the validity of this point in the absence
of patent protection. If anything, the opposite has been established; in those
few industries where the competitors are few in number, competition has
kept prices so low that new domestic competitors have found it impossible
to establish a profitable entry. The myth of "monopoly prices" has become
even more unreal as a result of the current diversification trend. At the
present time, no area of business is sacred or immune from invasion by
outside companies, and the most attractive areas of entry will be those
characterized by high prices and high profits.
The primary needs today, as at any time in antitrust enforcement
(particularly with respect to mergers), are faith in competition and for-
bearance. Since much of the current antitrust dialogue relates to the social
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rather than the competitive effects of conglomerate mergers, the effort to
use antitrust as a weapon against the conglomerate movement raises serious
antitrust policy questions. Considering that conglomerate mergers may have
the capacity for reviving tired industries, a too rigid stand could be a
perversion of antitrust. Amidst all the discussion, studies and pending litiga-
tion, one primary fact has emerged; the current state of knowledge of the
consequences of conglomerate mergers does not justify the adoption of any
long range restrictive policies at this time.
It should be recognized that the conglomerate movement has slowed
substantially. Although McLaren's crusade has contributed to this reduction,
the primary causal factor has been investor disillusionment with the promises
of the conglomerators. The earnings anticipated have not materialized.
The investor disappointment has caused substantial stock price declines,
which in turn have made the offers of the super-conglomerators unattractive
to companies which might have been interested in selling. Further, it is
likely that regulatory measures in the financial, securities, and tax areas
will preclude the successful completion of some questionable conglomerate
mergers. Finally, it is certainly predictable that antitrust efforts will con-
tinue, and reasonably predictable that existing antitrust laws will be found
effective against conglomerate mergers which substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to monopoly. The result is that at the present time no
need has been established for a radical antitrust-based approach to con-
glomerate mergers.
